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123 S. Ct. 993 (2003) (mem.)
I. Background
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma' found
that it was unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on a defendant who was
under the age of sixteen at the time the offense was committed.' Almost exactly
one year later, the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky ("Stanford I"),3 despite a vigorous
dissent, found that it was constitutional to impose the death penalty on a defen-
dant who was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time the offense was
committed.4 Therefore, as the twenty-first century approached, the line for the
constitutional execution of juveniles was drawn at sixteen years of age.
On August 28, 2002, the Supreme Court denied an application for a stay of
execution from a petitioner who was seventeen years of age at the time of the
offense.5 Justice Stevens dissented, as did Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.6 Justice
Stevens renewed Justice Brennan's dissent in StanfordI and stated that an "appar-
ent consensus" against the execution of juvenile offenders existed among the
states and the international community.7 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice
Breyer, agreed with Justice Stevens and added that the Court's recent decision in
1. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
2. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,838 (1988) (plurality opinion). justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens's opinion. Id. at 818. Justice O'Connor con-
curred in the opinion and found that the available evidence suggested a national consensus that
forbade the imposition of the death penalty on defendants who were under sixteen years of age at
the time of the offense. Id. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
3. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
4. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) ("Stanford F'). Justice O'Connor
concurred in this opinion as well and stated that proportionality analysis for these cases may
become relevant at some future point. Id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented. Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct 24, 24 (2002) (mem.). For a discussion and analysis of
Patterson, see Janice L. Kopec, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 291, 291-92 (2002) (analyzing Patterson
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 24 (2002)).
6. Patterson, 123 S. Ct. at 24 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
7. See Patterson, 123 S. Ct. at 24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I joined [Justice Brennan's
dissenting] opinion and remain convinced that it correctly interpreted the law."); StanfordI, 492 U.S.
at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
Atkins v. Virginia made it possible for the Court to reconsider its decision in
Stanford .' Nearly two months later, in In re Stanford ("Stanford II"), ° the Court
considered Stanford's application for an original writ of habeas corpus."
II. Holding
The United States Supreme Court, without a majority opinion, denied
Stanford's petition for an original writ of habeas corpus. 2 This time, four
Justices stated in dissent that they would have set the application for an original
writ for argument. 3 The dissent based its opinion on the Court's recent holding
in Atkins and concluded that offenses committed by juveniles under the age of
eighteen do not merit the death penalty. 4
III. Analysis
The dissent did not restate the reasons for the Court's opinion in Atkins.
Instead, it quoted Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Stanford L6 It then
compared Justice Brennan's observations with the state of juvenile death sen-
tences in 2002."7
A. Justice Brennan's Dissent in Stanford I
Justice Stevens quoted, at length, Justice Brennan's dissent in Stanford's first
hearing before the Court in 1989.8 Specifically, Justice Brennan stated that
"juveniles so generally lack the degree of responsibility for their crimes that is a
predicate for the constitutional imposition of the death penalty that the Eighth
Amendment forbids that they receive that punishment."'9  Justice Brennan
continued by examining various rights, such as the rights to vote, to serve on a
jury, and to marry without parental consent, that are either banned or strictly
restricted to juveniles under the age of eighteen.2" In his opinion, such legislation
8. 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
9. Patterson, 123 S. Ct. at 24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct.
at 2242, 2252 (holding that execution of mentally retarded violates Eighth Amendment).
10. 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002) (mem.).
11. In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472, 472 (2002) (mem.) ("Stanford Ir').
12. Id.
13. Id. at 475 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was the fourth Justice willing to hear
oral arguments on the issue. Id. See generally Patterson, 123 S. Ct. at 24 (indicating that Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented).
14. Id. at 472-73, 475.
15. Id. at 473.
16. Id. at 473-74; see Stanford 1, 492 U.S. at 382-405 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Stanford I, 123 S. Ct. at 474-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 473 (citing Stanford I, 492 U.S. at 382-405 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
19. Id. (quoting Stanford I, 492 U.S. at 394 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
20. Id. (quoting Stanford 1, 492 U.S. at 394 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Justice Brennan found
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was evidence that juveniles are "more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-
disciplined than adults ... without the same 'capacity to control their conduct
and to think in long-range terms.' ,21 Justice Brennan found that society draws
a dividing line at the age at which it is reasonable to assume that a person pos-
sesses the ability to make, and can take responsibility for, judgments.22
B. Atkins v. Virginia
Four months before Stanford II, the Court in Atkins held that the imposition
of the death penalty on the mentally retarded was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment because it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.23 The Court
first examined its conclusions in Peny v. Ljnaugh,24 in which it found that four-
teen states did not institute the death penalty and two states expressly banned the
imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded.25 It then compared
Penrys findings to the situation in June of 2002, at which time it found that
nineteen additional states had passed laws banning the imposition of the death
penalty on the mentally retarded.26 The Court decided that the legislative trend
was evidence of society's views that the mentally retarded are "categorically less
culpable than the average criminal" and that a national consensus against execut-
ing the mentally retarded had developed since its decision in Pengy.
27
The Court also agreed, on its own, with the national consensus. 2 First, it
found that two common justifications for the death penalty, retribution and
deterrence, do not apply equally to the mentally retarded as they do to the
average murderer.29 It then found that the mentally retarded face a greater risk
that all but two states had a uniform age of majority at eighteen or above, that no state lowered its
voting age or juror-eligibility age below eighteen, that only four states allowed persons under
eighteen to marry without parental consent, that thirty-seven states required a patient to be eighteen
or over in order to consent validly to medical treatment, that thirty-four states required parental
consent before a person below eighteen was allowed to drive, that forty-two states prohibited the
sale of pornographic material to persons under eighteen, and that states where gambling was legal
generally did not allow persons under eighteen to participate in gambling activities. Id. (quoting
Stanford I, 492 U.S. at 394-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
21. Id. (quoting Stanford I, 492 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CON-
FRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978))).
22. Id. at 474 (quoting Stanford I, 492 U.S. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
23. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
24. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
25. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2248 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989)).
26. Id. at 2248-49.
27. Id. at 2249.
28. Id. at 2252.
29. Id. at 2251; see also Kristen F. Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 117, 119-20
(examining Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002)). The Court in Atkins found that retribution
does not apply because society considers the mentally retarded less culpable than the average
criminal, and that deterrence does not apply because the mentally retarded have a diminished ability
2003]
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than the average murderer of being wrongly executed because they face a greater
risk of giving false confessions, possess a diminished ability to present mitigating
evidence, may be unable to provide meaningful assistance to their counsel, and
could appear to the jury to be poor witnesses and unremorseful defendants.3"
The Court found that all these factors, if viewed in the context of society's
"evolving standards of decency," showed that execution of the mentally retarded
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.
31
C Justice Stevens's Dissent in Stanford II
The dissent stated that not only did Justice Brennan's observations apply as
forcefully and correctly in 2002 as they did in 1989, but that the evidence in 2002
served to strengthen his argument.3 2 The dissent first determined that "the trend
tends to require individuals to be older, rather than younger" in according legal
obligations and responsibilities to juveniles.33 The dissent also cited scientific
evidence that indicates that adolescent brains are not fully developed, which can
cause erratic behaviors and thought processes, and scientific data that further
supports Justice Brennan's opinion that adolescents should be considered "more
vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults."34
The dissent found that a national consensus against the execution of
juvenile offenders had developed since Stanford's first appearance before the
Court in 1989."s Specifically, the dissent found that no state had lowered the
death-eligible age to sixteen or seventeen between 1989 and 2002.36 The dissent
further stated that the attention state legislatures were giving to the issue of
juvenile executions was "remarkable" because the legislatures were taking action
despite the fact that juvenile offenders make up only two percent of the total
population on death row.37 The dissent also found that legislatures that
to understand and learn from experiences or to control impulses and that the mentally retarded are
thus less likely to be able to conform their actions to the severity of the death penalty. Atkins, 122
S. Ct. at 2251.
30. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2251-52; see also Grunewald, supra note 29, at 120.
31. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32. Stanford 11, 123 S. Ct. at 474 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Id. (citing U.S. NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 418-22, 478-88 (Richard Leiter ed.,
The Gale Group, 4th ed. 2001)).
34. Id. (citing Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 3-5; Stanford 1, 492 U.S. at 395 (Brennan,
J., dissenting)).
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SEN-
TENCES AND EXECUTIONS FORJUVENILE CRIMES,JANUARY 1,1973-SEPTEMBER 30,2002 (updated
Jan. 9, 2003), at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm). Justice Stevens relied on
a version that was updated on October 9, 2002. Stanford I, 123 S. Ct. at 474.
37. Id. The dissent noted that the low percentage should have meant that the issue would
draw minimal interest from the public and from the legislatures, but that instead the opposite was
[Vol. 15:2
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addressed the subject acted "uniformly against the execution of those who were
under 18 when they committed their offense. 38 Finally, the dissent cited a 2001
poll that indicated that the majority of Americans disapprove of the use of the
death penalty against juvenile offenders.3 Justice Stevens concluded by stating
that he did not believe that offenses committed by juveniles under the age of
eighteen merit the death penalty and that "[t]he practice of executing such
offenders is a relic of the past and is inconsistent with evolving standards of
decency in a civilized society."'
IV. GeneralApplication
Justices Stevens's dissent from the denial of a stay in Patterson was joined
only by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer." The Stevens dissent in Stanford I gained
another supporter in Justice Souter.42 The Stevens dissent appeared to predict
that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus would be granted for the next case
involving a juvenile capital defendant. 3 In Hain v. Mullin," however, a petition
for a writ of certiorari was denied to a juvenile capital defendant, Scott Allen
Hain ("Hain").4 5 Because the petition was denied without an opinion, supporting
or dissenting, it is perhaps important that Hain's appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit was framed in terms of whether the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") applied to juvenile defendants in the
United States."
Justice Stevens has already indicated, based on his strong language at the
conclusion of his dissent, that he would find an Eighth Amendment violation in
cases of juvenile executions. 7 Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer would
almost certainly make the same finding based on the fact that they joined in
true. Id. at 474-75.
38. Stanford I, 123 S. Ct. at 475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Id. (citing TOM W. SMITH, PUBLIC OPINION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR YOUTHS 2,
6, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago (Dec. 2001)). This poll is available at
http://www.norc.org/issues/DeathPenalty.pd) (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
40. Id.
41. Patterson, 123 S. Ct. at 24.
42. Stanford I, 123 S. Ct. at 472.
43. Five votes are required to grant a stay of execution. Four votes are required to grant a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
44. 123 S. Ct. 993 (2003).
45. Hain v. Mullin, 123 S. Ct. 993, 993 (2003) (mem.); see Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224,
1242 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that defendant was seventeen years old at time of crime).
46. Hain, 287 F.3d at 1242. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the ICCPR was not binding on
Oklahoma or federal courts. Id. at 1242-43. Hain also argued that imposing the death penalty for
crimes committed while the defendant was a juvenile violates peremptory norms of international
law, known asjus cogens, but the Tenth Circuit rejected that claim as well. Id. at 1243-44.
47. See Stanford I, 123 S. Ct. at 475 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating "We should put an end
to this shameful practice.").
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Justice Stevens's dissent.' The deciding vote, if a future hearing arises on the
issue, may come from Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor chose only to concur
in the judgment in Stanford 1' At the time, Justice O'Connor stated:
The day may come when there is such general legislative rejection of
the execution of 16- or 17-year old capital murderers that a clear
national consensus can be said to have developed. Because I do not
believe that day has yet arrived, I concur in... the Court's opinion,
and I concur in its judgment."0
Justice O'Connor further stated that the Court has "a constitutional obligation
to conduct proportionality analysis."5 Justice O'Connor clarified that "specifi-
cally identified age-based statutory classifications [are] 'relevant to Eighth
Amendment proportionality analysis."'"52
Perhaps more importantly, Justice O'Connor joined in the majority opinion
in Atkins. 3 It is difficult to determine how she would decide on the issue of
juvenile executions given her decisions in Atkins and Stanford II. One may
anticipate, however, that at some point she would be amenable to a convincing
argument that a national consensus, disapproving of the execution of juveniles,
has arisen.
V. Application in Vitginia
In Virginia, the minimum age for a defendant to qualify for the death
penalty is sixteen. 4 However, the age of the defendant, at the time she commit-
ted the offense, is considered a potential mitigating factor for juries to consider
during the sentencing phase of trial.55 Virginia has sentenced five juveniles to
death. 6
Assuming that the General Assembly does not change the statutes to
abolish execution of juveniles, a capital defense attorney can avoid the execution
of her juvenile client in one of three ways. First, the jury can impose a life
sentence. The second possibility is for the Supreme Court of Virginia to over-
turn a death sentence after conducting a proportionality review. Third, the
48. See id. at 472.
49. Stanford 1, 492 U.S. at 380 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 381-82.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 382 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 854 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
53. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2244. Justice Kennedy also joined in the majority opinion. Id.
54. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(a) (Michie Supp. 2002) (stating that defendant must have
been sixteen years of age or older at time offense was committed to qualify for death penalty).
55. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(v) (Michie 2000) (stating that age of defendant at
time of commission of capital offense is fact in mitigation).
56. See Edmund P. Power, Too Young to Die: The Juvenil Death Penaly AfterAtkins v. Virginia,
15 CAP. DEF.J. 93, 103 n.86 (2002) (listing cases in which juveniles have been sentenced to death).
[Vol. 15:2
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execution of juvenile offenders can be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court of Virginia has made it nearly impossible for capital defendants to con-
vince the courts that proportionality demands a life sentence.5 7 This is true even
if the defendant is a juvenile. 8 Although the four-person dissent in Stanford II
appeared to open the door for an unconstitutionality argument, the denial of a
writ in Hain suggests that more time may be needed before such a claim is
successful.
In every case involving a sixteen- or seventeen-year old defendant, a capital
defense attorney must object because the Stevens dissent in Stanford II, despite
Hain, suggests that the Supreme Court might, in the foreseeable future, recon-
sider the constitutionality of such juvenile executions. Attorneys are urged
strongly to observe all the necessary procedures for such objections in order to
avoid waiver of the claims or procedural default on appeal.5" The attorney must
make sure all objections are timely and raised on direct appeal.
1/7. Conclusion
The issue of juvenile executions is likely to be a contentious issue for the
foreseeable future. The United States Supreme Court is likely to address this
issue again in what could be another close vote. Capital defense attorneys who
are representing juvenile offenders are strongly encouraged to contact the
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for motions to declare the juvenile death
penalty unconstitutional. 6°
171. Epilogue
On April 2, 2003, the Tenth Circuit voted 2-1 to stay Hain's execution while
it considered his latest appeal.6 The State of Oklahoma appealed to the Supreme
57. See general# Cynthia M. Bruce, Proportionahty Review: Still Inadequate, But Still Necessay, 14
CAP. DERJ. 265 (2002) (examining proportionality review, or lack thereof, in Virginia).
58. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 538, 555 n.6 (Va. 1998) (stating that its
proportionality review was not limited to records in cases in which defendants were sixteen years
of age when offenses were committed, but, instead, considered age as one of many relevant
factors). But see Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 555 (Hassell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(finding that review of cases involving sixteen-year-old defendants indicated thatJackson's sentence
was disproportionate).
59. See generaly Ashley Flynn, ProceduralDefault: A De Facto Exception to Civiho?, 12 CAP. DEF.
J. 289 (2000) (describing how attorney's civility can lead to procedural default).
60. For a general overview of Atkins and its applicability to juvenile death sentences, see
Power, supra note 56.
61. Robert E. Boczkiewicz & Bob Doucette, Condemned Man Gets Last-Minute Delay, THE
DAiLY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 1A, 2003 WL 17307520. Ham's latest appeal sought federal
funds for a second clemency hearing. Id.
2003]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
Court; the Court granted the State's application to vacate the stay of execution.6 2
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, however, voted to deny the
application to vacate the stay of execution.63 On April 3, 2003, Hain was put to
death.64
Philip H. Yoon
62. Mullin v. Hain, No. 02a848, 2003 WL 1786241, at *1 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2003) (mem.).
63. Id. (stating thatjustices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer "would deny the applica-
tion to vacate the stay of execution").
64. Gina Holland, Man Who Killed As Teen Put to Death, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE,
Apr. 4, 2003, at 2003 WL 18221096.
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